Monday, May 12, 2008
"ISF"
A humvee military vehicle idles on a broad avenue as an Iraqi army soldier walks nonchalantly past without so much as a glance at the body slung across the bonnet. The dead man's trousers have been pulled down to his ankles, exposing white underwear below a torn T-shirt drenched in blood from wounds to his chest and side.
Link.
Tuesday, April 29, 2008
Suq al-Shiyukh
A massacre that you will not see on CNN, perpetrated by the US-backed "Iraqi security forces" or, more accurately, Badr/SIIC/ Da'wa gangs in uniform and out of uniform (many of the armed gangs in the video are dressed in civilian clothes). The scene is reminiscent of images from the south during the 1991 uprising against Saddam's regime, proving that not much has really changed except the roles have been switched again, with American blessings. This took place in Suq al-Shiyukh, south east of Nasiriya, where residents said Iraqi special forces detained 58 suspected Sadrists, executed them and set them on fire after raiding the Sadrists' headquarters in town. The soldiers are heard spitting out obscenities at the wounded detainees and even at dead bodies. Others are seen dragging another injured detainee, kicking him violently and cursing him before throwing him on a pile of dead bodies. We hear shooting in the background as other detainees are dragged to join the pile. Those are the "security forces" that our American friends want us to trust and to condemn attacks targeting them. The talk of the town is that the Iraqi division commander's brother, a SIIC member, was killed a few days ago by suspected Mahdi Army militiamen, and that this was his revenge. The force surrounded the town and raided the local Sadr Bureau. Another episode in Iraq's bloody civil war and settling of accounts between warring militias.
Monday, April 21, 2008
Abandon Ship
Thursday, April 17, 2008
Basrah
Justifying the lack of any interference by British troops to stop political parties, militias and gangs from spreading unrest in the city, a former British commander said that his troops did not want to breach the “traditions” of Basra’s society. The government is using similar arguments. An official in the Supreme Security Committee of the province’s council has denied the existence of organized religious and sectarian crime against women, claiming that 85% of murder incidences are “honor crimes”. Declining to reveal the number of “slaughtered” women, a leading source in Basra’s police said that disclosing such information would create turmoil in the city.
More.
Thursday, April 03, 2008
Iraq After the Surge: Political Prospects
UPDATE:
TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE ON IRAQ
By William E. Odom, LT General, USA, Ret.
2 April 2008
Good morning Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. It is an honor to appear before you again. The last occasion was in January 2007, when the topic was the troop surge. Today you are asking if it has worked. Last year I rejected the claim that it was a new strategy. Rather, I said, it is a new tactic used to achieve the same old strategic aim, political stability. And I foresaw no serious prospects for success.
I see no reason to change my judgment now. The surge is prolonging instability, not creating the conditions for unity as the president claims.
Last year, General Petraeus wisely declined to promise a military solution to this political problem, saying that he could lower the level of violence, allowing a limited time for the Iraqi leaders to strike a political deal. Violence has been temporarily reduced but today there is credible evidence that the political situation is far more fragmented. And currently we see violence surge in Baghdad and Basra. In fact, it has also remained sporadic and significant inseveral other parts of Iraq over the past year, notwithstanding the notable drop in Baghdad and Anbar Province.
More disturbing, Prime Minister Maliki has initiated military action and then dragged in US forces to help his own troops destroy his Shiite competitors. This is a political setback, not a political solution. Such is the result of the surge tactic.
No less disturbing has been the steady violence in the Mosul area, and the tensions in Kirkuk between Kurds, Arabs, and Turkomen. A showdown over control of the oil fields there surely awaits us. And the idea that some kind of a federal solution can cut this Gordian knot strikes me as a wild fantasy, wholly out of touch with Kurdish realities.
Also disturbing is Turkey's military incursion to destroy Kurdish PKK groups in the border region. That confronted the US government with a choice: either to support its NATO ally, or to make good on its commitment to Kurdish leaders to insure their security. It chose the former, and that makes it clear to the Kurds that the United States will sacrifice their security to its larger interests in Turkey.
Turning to the apparent success in Anbar province and a few other Sunni areas, this is not the positive situation it is purported to be. Certainly violence has declined as local Sunni shieks have begun to cooperate with US forces. But the surge tactic cannot be given full credit. The decline started earlier on Sunni initiative. What are their motives? First, anger at al Qaeda operatives and second, their financial plight.
Their break with al Qaeda should give us little comfort. The Sunnis welcomed anyone who would help them kill Americans, including al Qaeda. The concern we hear the president and his aides express about a residual base left for al Qaeda if we withdraw is utter nonsense. The Sunnis will soon destroy al Qaeda if we leave Iraq. The Kurds do not allow them in their region, and the Shiites, like the Iranians, detest al Qaeda. To understand why, one need only take note of the al Qaeda public diplomacy campaign over the past year or so on internet blogs. They implore the United States to bomb and invade Iran and destroy this apostate Shiite regime. As an aside, it gives me pause to learn that our vice president and some members of the Senate are aligned with al Qaeda on spreading the war to Iran.
Let me emphasize that our new Sunni friends insist on being paid for their loyalty. I have heard, for example, a rough estimate that the cost in one area of about 100 square kilometers is $250,000 per day. And periodically they threaten to defect unless their fees are increased. You might want to find out the total costs for these deals forecasted for the next several years, because they are not small and they do not promise to end. Remember, we do not own these people. We merely rent them. And they can break the lease at any moment. At the same time, this deal protects them to some degree from the government's troops and police, hardly a sign of political reconciliation.
Now let us consider the implications of the proliferating deals with the Sunni strongmen. They are far from unified among themselves. Some remain with al Qaeda. Many who break and join our forces are beholden to no one. Thus the decline in violence reflects a dispersion of power to dozens of local strong men who distrust the government and occasionally fight among themselves. Thus the basic military situation is far worse because of the proliferation of armed groups under local military chiefs who follow a proliferating number of political bosses.
This can hardly be called greater military stability, much less progress toward political consolidation, and to call it fragility that needs more time to become success is to ignore its implications. At the same time, Prime Minister Maliki's military actions in Basra and Baghdad, indicate even wider political and military fragmentation. We are witnessing is more accurately described as the road to the Balkanization of Iraq, that is, political fragmentation. We are being asked by the president to believe that this shift of so much power and finance to so many local chieftains is the road to political centralization. He describes the process as building the state from the bottom up.
I challenge you to press the administration's witnesses this week to explain this absurdity. Ask them to name a single historical case where power has been aggregated successfully from local strong men to a central government except through bloody violence leading to a single winner, most often a dictator. That is the history of
feudal Europe's transformation to the age of absolute monarchy. It is the story of the American colonization of the west and our Civil War. It took England 800 years to subdue clan rule on what is now the English-Scottish border. And it is the source of violence in Bosnia and Kosovo.
How can our leaders celebrate this diffusion of power as effective state building? More accurately described, it has placed the United States astride several civil wars. And it allows all sides to consolidate, rearm, and refill their financial coffers at the US expense.
To sum up, we face a deteriorating political situation with an over extended army. When the administration's witnesses appear before you, you should make them clarify how long the army and marines can sustain this band-aid strategy.
The only sensible strategy is to withdraw rapidly but in good order. Only that step can break the paralysis now gripping US strategy in the region. The next step is to choose a new aim, regional stability, not a meaningless victory in Iraq. And progress toward that goal requires revising our policy toward Iran. If the president merely renounced his threat of regime change by force, that could prompt Iran to lessen its support to Taliban groups in Afghanistan. Iran detests the Taliban and supports them only because they will kill more Americans in Afghanistan as retaliation in event of a US attack on Iran. Iran's policy toward Iraq would also have to change radically as we withdraw. It cannot want instability there. Iraqi Shiites are Arabs, and they know that Persians look down on them. Cooperation between them has its limits.
No quick reconciliation between the US and Iran is likely, but US steps to make Iran feel more secure make it far more conceivable than a policy calculated to increase its insecurity. The president's policy has reinforced Iran's determination to acquire nuclear weapons, the very thing he purports to be trying to prevent.
Withdrawal from Iraq does not mean withdrawal from the region. It must include a realignment and reassertion of US forces and diplomacy that give us a better chance to achieve our aim.
A number of reasons are given for not withdrawing soon and completely. I have refuted them repeatedly before but they have more lives than a cat. Let try again me explain why they don't make
sense.
First, it is insisted that we must leave behind military training element with no combat forces to secure them. This makes no sense at all. The idea that US military trainers left alone in Iraq can be safe and effective is flatly rejected by several NCOs and junior officers I have heard describe their personal experiences. Moreover, training foreign forces before they have a consolidated political authority to command their loyalty is a windmill tilt. Finally, Iraq is not short on military skills.
Second, it is insisted that chaos will follow our withdrawal. We heard that argument as the "domino theory" in Vietnam. Even so, the path to political stability will be bloody regardless of whether we withdraw or not. The idea that the United States has a moral responsibility to prevent this ignores that reality. We are certainly to blame for it, but we do not have the physical means to prevent it. American leaders who insist that it is in our power to do so are misleading both the public and themselves if they believe it. The real moral question is whether to risk the lives of more Americans. Unlike preventing chaos, we have the physical means to stop sending more troops where many will be killed or wounded. That is the moral responsibility to our country which no American leaders seems willing to assume.
Third, nay sayers insist that our withdrawal will create regional instability. This confuses cause with effect. Our forces in Iraq and our threat to change Iran's regime are making the region unstable. Those who link instability with a US withdrawal have it exactly backwards. Our ostrich strategy of keeping our heads buried in the sands of Iraq has done nothing but advance our enemies' interest.
I implore you to reject these fallacious excuses for prolonging the commitment of US forces to war in Iraq.
Thanks for this opportunity to testify today.
Thursday, March 27, 2008
"This is not a battle against the Jaish al-Mahdi nor is it a proxy war between the United States and Iran," military spokesman Maj. Gen. Kevin Bergner said, using the Arabic term for the Mahdi Army. "It is the government of Iraq taking the necessary action to deal with criminals on the streets."(Link.)
This would be amusing if it were not so tragic. The US military, knowingly or not, is fighting Iran's wars for them in Iraq, not against Iran. SIIC and Da'wa (Iran's strongest allies in Iraq) are determined to retain control of the Shi'ite south, and the crackdown against the Sadrists, which caused them to revolt, is a feeble attempt to prevent them from taking over in the upcoming provincial elections. And to describe this ongoing intra-Shi'ite conflict as "the government of Iraq against criminals" is ludicrous at best, as the so-called "government of Iraq" had no problem in the near past when those hordes of criminals were taking to the streets cleansing Baghdad and the south from Sunnis with the active participation of "Iraqi security forces." But as we say in Arabic: 'If you know then it is a calamity. If you don't know then it is a greater one.'
UPDATE: Duh.
This does not mean that the central government should not reassert control of Basra. It is not peaceful, it is a significant prize as a port and the key to Iraq's oil exports, and gang rule is no substitute for legitimate government. But it is far from clear that what is happening is now directed at serving the nation's interest versus that of ISCI and Al Dawa in the power struggle to come. It is equally far from clear that the transfer of security responsibility to Iraqi forces in the south is not being used by Maliki, Al Dawa, and ISCI to cement control over the Shi'ite regions at Sadr's expense and at the expense of any potential local political leaders and movements. Certainly, the fact that these efforts come after ISCI's removal of its objections to the Provincial Powers Act may not be entirely coincidental.
Is the end result going to be good or bad? It is very difficult to tell. If the JAM and Sadr turn on the US, or if the current ISCI/Dawa power grab fails, then Shi'ite on Shi'ite violence could become far more severe. It is also far from clear that if the two religious-exile parties win, this is going to serve the cause of political accommodation or legitimate local and provincial government. It seems far more likely that even the best case outcome is going be one that favors Iraqracy over democracy.
Monday, March 03, 2008

Caption reads, "President Ahmadinejad makes historic visit to Iraq."
Saturday, February 23, 2008
Myth of the Surge
Sunday, February 17, 2008
Despair
They were then told by Abu Mohammed to get a plane to Cambodia and take a bus to Vietnam. Though their money was fast dwindling, they did so. Somehow, still speaking only Arabic, they made their way from Phnom Penh to Ho Chi Minh City. The plan was to get a ticket to Sweden by way of France (Bassim now thinks that this was a mistake and it would have been better to travel first to Lithuania, posing as citizens returning home, but this would have left the two Iraqis with the problem of explaining to officials there why they did not speak Lithuanian).
In the check-in queue at the airport in Vietnam on 5 January this year, Bassim was desperately worried he would be detected. He had staked all his remaining money and his family's future on getting to Sweden. In fact, he and Ibrahim had little chance of being allowed on to the plane. Too many Iraqis, claiming to be citizens of small East European states, had tried this route before. Suspicious Vietnamese immigration officials took them to an investigation room where Bassim felt ill and asked for a glass of water, which was refused. He and Ibrahim continued to protest that they were Lithuanian citizens and demanded to be taken to the Lithuanian embassy, knowing full well that Lithuania is unrepresented in Vietnam.
It was all in vain. The officials guessed that they were Iraqis. They sent Bassim and Ibrahim back to Cambodia. Half-starved because he did not like the local food – "I was used to Iraqi bread," he recalled later – and with his money almost gone, Bassim made his way back to Kuala Lumpur by the end of January. He last saw his friend Ibrahim heading for Indonesia in a small boat.
Abu Mohammed in Sweden became elusive and, when finally contacted by phone after six days, admitted that "for Iraqis, all the ways from Asia to Sweden are shut". He did not offer to return Bassim's $6,900. Demoralised, and hearing that many Iraqi refugees trying to get to Europe through Indonesia simply disappeared, Bassim used his last few dollars to fly to Damascus and took a shared taxi across the desert to Baghdad. "The journey took three months but it felt like 10 years," he said. "I have lost everything."
More.
Meanwhile, my brother-in-law, who has been trying to escape Iraq for months, tried to enter Jordan again (perhaps foolishly) only to be detained and sent back to Iraq again.
Thursday, February 07, 2008
Sadrists and the Surge
Thursday, January 31, 2008

Monday, December 24, 2007
He tried to explain to me the changes that have taken place in Baghdad, he said that the situation is about 5% better than how it was when I was Iraq, he says "do you remember the men we used to see on motorbics who used to kidnap people and kill people? Alqa`ida men?" I said "sure", he goes "well, yeah, now they call themselevs the Awakening men of Adhamiya, they have removed Alqa`ida masks from their stinky faces and now wearing the masks of the awakening wave, he said you would be amazed if you come to the area and see the checkpoints ran by even children, you may see a 14 year old kid rasing a gun in your face and asking you to obey him in order to check you for guns and explosives, he said the only reason that the situation now is a little better in the area is because the American troops have paid those guys money in order to work with them", he continues saying "the whole issue is about money, give money you get alliances".
More.
Sunday, December 16, 2007
Alive in Baghdad Reporter Killed
You are either a "Concerned Citizen" or a "Terrorist"
The undated video is painful to watch, both because of the terrible editing and the subject matter, but it doesn't appear to be dubbed. The posting that accompanied the video, originally found on Al-Jazeera's web forums, mentioned that the video was 30 minutes long and that it was filmed by someone attending the meeting in order to intimidate the tribal leader. The commander accuses the sheikh of being a "terrorist" for not reporting insurgents attacking Americans in his area. The sheikh looks devastated at this treatment, but he swallows it and offers to form a tribal force to guard the area, in return for U.S. funds and arms, of course.
EDIT: Apparently the video is from a 2005 PBS Frontline documentary, and the sheikh was brought in for interrogation after a rocket hit the U.S. military base in the area, wounding a soldier. So, I guess ignore the above paragraph.
It is hard to blame the sheikh in the video, despite the humiliating treatment he received, both from the U.S. commander and the Iraqi translator--who by the look and sound of him seems to be one those Chalabi-style exiles who have lived most of their life out of Iraq and then return and revel in treating their countrymen like dirt in order to please their newfound masters. The sheikh has the choice of accepting insurgents, or worse Al-Qaeda, to operate in his territory, risking that Americans come after him and his family, destroy his property, or kill them all in a strike against "suspected insurgents." Or, he could join forces with Americans to form an "awakening" group, and then risk that insurgents come after him for collaboration. Or, he could simply pack up and flee the country, like millions of Iraqis facing this dilemma decided to do rather than choose one or the other. The Iraqi government or Iraqi security forces are clearly not an option in this equation for well-known reasons.
I provided a transcript of the whole video below.
U.S. officer: The only way I can convince Col. Lanza not to put you in jail today is that there is an agreement that if you see these men, if you know they're setting up rockets, if you know they're fixing to set up some sort of ambush, then you have somebody call us and let us know that it's happened.
[Cut]
(Col. Stephen Lanza walks into meeting)
Sheikh: Welcome, I'm honoured. I apologise to the colonel.
[Cut]
Sheikh: Some people--
U.S. officer: In the district area, there is a misunderstanding going on between him and the people.
Sheikh: As far as I'm concerned, since the first day--
[Cut]
Sheikh: But some things could happen and I'm unaware of them.
U.S. officer: But there's things will happen, he doesn't know about.
Sheikh: So if my presence--my presence in the area is a problem, I'm ready to leave the area if you order so.
U.S. officer: If you want him to leave the area, he's ready to leave.
[Cut]
Col. Lanza: I have no reason to trust you. I have no reason to believe you. I have no reason to even believe anything you've told me today.
[Cut]
Col. Lanza: And there is no way, no way that you cannot know what is happening in your area.
(Iraqi interpreter provides translation)
Col. Lanza: And now you are asking me to give you a chance.
[Cut]
Col. Lanza: You come here today with no specific information.
(Iraqi interpreter)
Col. Lanza: I already know this ... So you have offered me nothing.
[Cut]
Col. Lanza: Rockets have been fired from your property, bombs have been planted right near your neighbourhood, right near your houses, right near your family's houses. It takes time to dig those bombs in, and people watch, people know, they watch the men dig those bombs, and they do nothing
(Iraqi interpreter)
Col. Lanza: You come to me today as the victim.
(Iraqi interpreter translates "victim" as "suspect" into Arabic)
Col. Lanza: But really you come as a terrorist ... as part of the Mujahideen.
(Iraqi interpreter)
Sheikh: I will bring together the people in my area, and we will set up guarding duties. If he [the colonel] orders, we can recruit the tribe as guards. Or how else does he want it?
Iraqi interpreter: He's gonna make some kind of neighbourhood watch or guards, if you want I can do that--
Col. Lanza: Why didn't you do it before? If you can do it now, why haven't you done it before?
(Iraqi interpreter)
Sheikh: I'm afraid of them [the Mujahideen], afraid.
[Cut]
Col. Lanza: This has been going on for eight months ...
(Iraqi interpreter)
Col. Lanza: The blood of two of my soldiers as well as numerous Iraqis are on your hands.
[Cut]
Iraqi interpreter: Tell them this thing should happen. Will they do it?
Sheikh: I don't have it.
Iraqi interpreter: What you just signed now is useless. This information you gave us, we already know. (Throws paper at sheikh)
[Cut]
Sheikh: You are correct.
Iraqi interpreter: Where are their addresses?
Sheikh: I will write their addresses now.
Iraqi interpreter: You know their addresses?
Sheikh: You mean their houses?
Iraqi interpreter: Write down their addresses. (Sheikh starts writing on paper)
Iraqi interpreter: He knows the addresses now.
Sheikh: I will write their addresses now. This one Fathi, first ... Dora.
[Cut]
Saturday, December 08, 2007



Tuesday, December 04, 2007
Rot Here or Die There
From the press release:
Lebanon’s refusal to legalize the stay of Iraqi refugees affects not just the relatively small proportion of Iraqi refugees who are arrested and detained. As a result of this policy, most Iraqi refugees in Lebanon live in fear of arrest. Without legal status in Lebanon, Iraqi refugees are vulnerable to exploitation and abuse by employers and landlords.
Human Rights Watch called on the Lebanese government to grant Iraqi refugees a temporary legal status that would provide, at a bare minimum, renewable residence and work permits. Apart from the small number of Iraqis who have been able to regularize their status, most Iraqi refugees are prohibited from working, and many have run out of their savings. Although entitled to attend public schools, very few Iraqi children enroll because their parents cannot afford to pay for transportation, clothes and books, and because the children are needed to work to contribute to the family income.
All Iraqis who have fled south and central Iraq to seek refuge in Lebanon or elsewhere in the Middle East are generally recognized as refugees by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). But Lebanon is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and does not give legal effect to UNHCR’s recognition of Iraqis as refugees. Instead, the Lebanese authorities treat as illegal immigrants Iraqis who enter Lebanon illegally or enter legally but then overstay their visas, regardless of their intent to seek asylum. Iraqi refugees are then subject to arrest, fines and detention by the Lebanese authorities.
Select testimonies from Iraqi refugees living in Lebanon featured in the report:
“No one tells me how long I am going to be in prison. I see people who have been here for eight months. If I can’t regularize my status, I will go back to Iraq. If I go back to Iraq, I will be killed. I don’t want to go back, but it is better for me to go back than to spend one more day being locked up with criminals.”
– An Iraqi refugee detained indefinitely in Roumieh Prison in Greater Beirut
“When we go out, we don’t know whether we will return. When I see a police man or a member of the authorities, I am very afraid, despite the fact that I am old and sick. Any time there is a checkpoint, we can get caught.”
– An Iraqi refugee living with his family illegally in Greater Beirut.
“I don’t want to go back to Iraq. I want to stay in Lebanon, even if they break every bone in my body, even if we don’t feel safe here, because we are illegal.”
– An Iraqi father recounted what happened when Lebanese authorities arrested and detained him and his son for illegal entry in 2005. After several months in Roumieh prison, they agreed to return to Iraq in exchange for release from detention. Once back in Iraq, the son was kidnapped. After paying a ransom, they fled again to Lebanon where they are currently living illegally.
Saturday, December 01, 2007
Sweden's Iraqi Refugee Trafficking Business
Some excerpts:
"In Damascus we meet Mikhael yet again. He is waiting for information about how the trip will be arranged. He has come up with the money by selling everything that he owned and had. To him -- as to most others -- there is no way back. When we meet him again he has just had contact with yet another smuggler who transports people between Turkey and Greece, hidden in an UN truck. -- That is where Mikhael will be hidden in a large wooden box together with 8 others.
He said that I have to pay him seven thousand dollars for it, and he said that he only takes seven to eight people every time. They will put them in a box, cover it, and make a small hole in the box in order to let air in so that one can breathe. Then they will put the box in the middle of the truck. Even if they stop the truck they would not discover the box, since it is in the middle of the truck platform. It is a truck which will bring things for the UN, from Turkey to Greece, and from Greece to Turkey."
***
"A man we met our first night in Damascus has decided to bring all his family with him on the journey. He does not dare to leave his wife and his children -- three and five years old. He has already bought the trip -- they will climb down inside the tank of a tanker with about forty other men, women and children. There they will hide during the journey over the mountains between Turkey and Greece, a trip which takes 24 hours. He has shifty eyes when I wonder how he will make a small three-year-old be quiet inside the steel tank for twenty four hours. He quietly says that it has to work, this is the only way out, because here in Damascus the money is running out, everything only gets more and more expensive."
***
"Another refugee, Mohammed, is a Sunni Muslim and was threatened to death by Mujahideen, the Islamic militia in his home district of Dora in Baghdad. He does not dare to meet us in public, so we meet in a lumber room behind a café. Five times Mohammed has tried to escape to Europe, but has been left by the smugglers on the road between Turkey and Greece.
He has had the maximum of bad luck. Three times he has been left at the border and been arrested. Twice he succeeded in passing the border, but the promised truck did not show up. No trucks came. He had been deceived by the smugglers. They had bluffed. Every time he was arrested he had to spend ten days in custody. Every time he lied, and said that he was a Palestinian. Had he said the truth, that he was an Iraqi, he would have been deported.
Now Mohammed tries to earn money for yet another trip, but it is hard because the prices are increasing all the time. There is no guarantee that he will not be deceived once again, because deceiving desperate refugees has also become a business. We meet many -- both in Damascus and in Sweden -- who have been deceived by smugglers, or people claiming to be smugglers, into paying large sums of money."
More.
Thursday, November 29, 2007
How Much Safer is Baghdad Now?
"I find the US military's solution foolish and simplistic … they are putting fuel next to fire," says Alaa Oweid, another lawyer, who has shunned the proposed reconciliation council. "What's the logic of rewarding the criminals by paying them, dressing them in uniforms, and telling them to protect the neighborhood?""
More.
By the way, is it not curious how the U.S. media for the large part has conveniently ignored the so-called "friendship and cooperation treaty" signed by the U.S. and Maliki's government? It passed at a time when the majority of Iraqi parliament opposes an extension of US occupation without a clear timetable for withdrawal. I thought the American line all along was that improvement in security, if it can be called so, would signal the end of the U.S. mission in Iraq, not extend it to years with plans for permanent bases and "investment" opportunities. Right?
Will the U.S. population and media conveniently go to sleep again when the time comes to wage the next war?
Monday, November 26, 2007
DM Shiite seeks VGL SF for love
More.
Sunday, November 18, 2007
Study of Iraqis in Jordan
The estimate was based on Jordanian immigration statistics, the number of Iraqi cell phone subscribers, and FAFO's household survey of Iraqis conducted in May 2007. FAFO, which undertook the study at the request of the Jordanian government, has not disclosed the number of Iraqis polled in the survey nor did it give a margin of error in the study.
Key findings:
-The survey showed that 68% of the Iraqis polled were Sunni Muslim, 17% were Shia Muslims, and 12% were Christians. Ethnically, 86.5% were Arab, 2.6% Kurd, 4.9% Kildani (Chaldean Catholic), 3.3% Ashurian (Assyrian Church of the East), 1.1% Turkomen, 0.9% Assyriani (Syriac Catholic and Orthodox), 0.6% Armenian (Orthodox and Catholic), and 0.1% other (Yezidi and Mandaean).
-Migration of Iraqis to Jordan is predominately a migration of families, 77% of which arrived after 2003, with the highest volume of population movement taking place in 2004 and 2005, according to Jordanian border authorities (this obviously does not take into count the Iraqis who were denied entry and turned back at the border or airport during 2006 and 2007--it would be interesting to see figures for that).
-The majority of the Iraqi community in Jordan is from Baghdad (76% from Baghdad, 7% from Basrah, 3% from Anbar, and 2% from Ninewa) and currently residing in the capital Amman. The community is almost exclusively urban.
-Iraqis in Jordan are well educated (over half have higher education degrees) and 22% of Iraqi adults in Jordan work. Close to 70% of the Iraqi population in Jordan is in working age (15+); of these, about 30% are participating in the work force (Only 15% of Iraqi women, who head one out of every five Iraqi households in Jordan, particularly poorer households, are working).
-The majority of Iraqis live on savings or receive money transfers from Iraq or abroad (42% receive transfers from Iraq). The poorest households are more dependent on income from employment, whereas the more wealthy households have a higher dependency on income from self employment and on transfers from Iraq. The middle wealth groups are the ones that have the least income from employment and are hence the most dependent on money transfers from outside Jordan.
-One in every five Iraqis has concrete plans to emigrate to a third country. A wish to go to a third country is found in all parts of the population, but it is particularly true for the poorer part and non-Muslim communities.
-More than 95% of those that wish to return to Iraq say that they will not
return to Iraq before the security situation allows for it. Plans to go back to Iraq are particularly seen among the Iraqi population with high levels of resources,
economically and with concern to high education, among the Muslim population and among the ones that came in 2006 and 2007 (late arrivals).
-Two of three Iraqi households have children under the age of 18 years as members (78% of Iraqi children between the ages of 7 and 17 are enrolled in school, with less than 60% for the poorer population). The average size of an Iraqi household in Jordan is 4.1 persons.
-The majority of the Iraqi population is 25 years of age and above (56%), 26% of the population is below 15 years of age and the remaining 18 percent are between 15 and 25 years of age.
-Respondents indicate two main reasons for remaining in Jordan; about half of the Iraqi population gives the difficult security situation as their main reason, particularly among men and non-Muslim communities. The second most important reason is family reunion; 38% of all Iraqis give this as their main reason for remaining in the country. The rest say they came for work.
-About 56% of Iraqis say they have a valid permit to stay legally in Jordan (80% of the wealthy population has permits, but only 22% of the poorest part).
There is more information on FAFO's website, including sample questionnaires and notes on their survey methodology.
Tuesday, November 13, 2007
Inside the Surge
Some parts that stand out:
A few days before General Petraeus testified before Congress, I met with Sheikh Zaidan al-Awad, a prominent Sunni tribal leader from Anbar. The last time I had seen him, in 2004, he was full of hostile bluster about the U.S., and made no secret of his identification with the “resistance,” as he described the hard-line Sunni insurgents. Sheikh Zaidan was a fugitive, suspected by the Americans of being a sponsor of the insurgency, and he was living in voluntary exile in Jordan. But when we spoke this fall, in an apartment in Amman, Zaidan told me that he had recently met for informal talks with American military and intelligence officials, because he approved of what they were now doing—allowing Sunni tribesmen to police themselves.
I asked Zaidan what sort of deal had led to the Sunni Awakening. “It’s not a deal,” he said, bristling. “People have come to realize that our fate is tied to the Americans’, and theirs to ours. If they are successful in Iraq, it will depend on Anbar. We always said this. Time was lost. America was lost, but now it’s woken up; it now holds a thread in its hand. For the first time, they’re doing something right.”
Zaidan said that Anbar’s Sunni tribes no longer had any need to exact blood vengeance on U.S. forces. “We’ve already taken our revenge,” he said. “We’re the ones who’ve made them crawl on their stomachs, and now we’re the ones to pick them up.” He added, “Once Anbar is settled, we must take control of Baghdad, and we will.” There would have to be a lot more fighting before the capital was taken back from the Shiites, he said. “The Anbaris will take charge of the purge. What the whole world failed to do in Anbar, we have done overnight. Baghdad will be a lot easier.”
. . .
Tribal vendettas have been an underlying feature of the Iraq war since it began. Amar’s story may be unusual in the scale of his ambitions—a hundred men for his brother—but such crimes are common. At least some of the initial impetus for Iraq’s insurgency came in the spring of 2003, when American troops in Falluja shot and killed seventeen demonstrators, and kinsmen of the dead sought revenge by killing Americans. In tribal families, it is often the matriarch who encourages the vendetta, as Amar’s mother did.
Um Jafaar is a handsome, elderly woman. When I arrived at her home, with Karim, she was wearing a black abaya, and I noticed blue tribal tattoos on her chin and her hands. She invited me to sit down on a couch, and sat next to me in an armchair. Jafaar’s three young daughters were watching us. When I asked Um Jafaar if she wanted revenge for her son’s death, she got up from her chair, came over, and kissed the top of my head.
“Yes, I want revenge,” she said. “I am a mother, and I lost my son for nothing.” She began weeping, great wracking sobs. When she recovered, Um Jafaar pointed to her granddaughters. “Look, they have no father,” she said. “Why?”
Um Jafaar went on to tell me that she took the body parts of Amar’s victims, wrapped in cloth, to his grave, in the holy city of Najaf, and buried them there. “I talk to my son, I tell him, ‘Here, this is from those who killed you, I take revenge.’ ” Moving one hand in a horizontal circle, she said, “I put them around the grave. So far, I have taken one hand, one eye, an Adam’s apple, toes, fingers, ears, and noses.” (Karim told me that the hand had made the house stink for days.) I asked her how many Mahdi men Amar had killed. “I don’t know: eighteen, twenty? But still my heart hurts. Even if we kill all of them, I won’t have comfort,” she said.
Sunday, November 11, 2007
Meet Abu Abed: the US's new ally against al-Qaida

Ghaith Abdul-Ahad
November 10, 2007
...
A senior Sunni sheikh, whose tribe is joining the new alliance with the Americans against al-Qaida, told me in Beirut that it was a simple equation for him. "It's just a way to get arms, and to be a legalised security force to be able to stand against Shia militias and to prevent the Iraqi army and police from entering their areas," he said.
"The Americans lost hope with an Iraqi government that is both sectarian and dominated by militias, so they are paying for locals to fight al-Qaida. It will create a series of warlords.
"It's like someone who brought cats to fight rats, found himself with too many cats and brought dogs to fight the cats. Now they need elephants."
...
Abu Abed told me of his grand dreams. "Ameriya is just the beginning. After we finish with al-Qaida here, we will turn toward our main enemy, the Shia militias. I will liberate Jihad [a Sunni area next to Ameriya taken over by the Mahdi army] then Saidiya and the whole of west Baghdad."
More.
Monday, October 29, 2007
Iraq News Source
So, while I've not had much time lately to update the blog, and since virtually all Iraqi bloggers have left Iraq anyway, I'll point out a local Iraqi wire agency that is increasingly posting dispatches in English. Of course most of the content is still in Arabic, but at least you'll get a much better picture of the security situation in Iraq from what is available than what you get from American news outlets:
Voices of Iraq.
Thursday, October 11, 2007
Good-bye My Beloved Baghdad
I write these words while I say good-bye to you, my beloved Baghdad. I say good-bye while the pain and the grief tear my heart and fill my essence and feeling. You are the city which embraced my father and other Armenians who survived the Armenian Genocide in 1915 and provided them with shelter and means of living and comfort. In you I was born, grew up and finished my elementary, intermediate and secondary studies in the Armenian Private School.
Also in you, I dreamed and had my first childhood love in school. I graduated from the school, where I was ever superior, to enter your College of Engineering from which I had graduated as a constructional engineer to serve you through my specialty and to engage in your reconstruction. Then, I joined the compulsory military service during the Iraqi-Iranian war and completed my postgraduate study in 1988. During the study, I loved an Armenian young woman, who was a student at the same Department and broke off my relation after years, because she had left you and immigrated to the unknown world. After invading Kuwait in 1990, I served in the Army as a reservist and went out of it after the end of the Second Gulf war in 1991.
In you, my beloved Baghdad, I practiced activities in the Armenian Diocese and cultural associations and Iraqi cultural forums by giving lectures on the history of the Armenian people and Church, the Armenian Cause and interpreting the Bible. I also wrote articles, worked as a journalist in some of your newspapers and worked in the Embassy of Armenia, till the members of the mission left you before the US-UK campaign to invade you began in March 2003. I worked as a lecturer in the University and this was my history I made in you with great efforts which I was proud of and I dreamed to tell my children about in the future while being in you.
However, everything in you has changed, my beloved Baghdad, after you are afflicted with wounds and treachery of the friends and enemies from each side. You are bleeding, death is spread everywhere in you not excluding anyone and life became unbearable and kind of madness and suicide. You lost means of living and all kinds of public services.
Despite great difficulties I faced in you that lasted for more than a quarter century, beginning with the Iraqi-Iranian war, passing through the UN economic unjust sanctions and the invasion, I remained adhered to you like a baby adhered to his mother. However, I now may have lost patience and the ability to withstand after all my family members and relatives have left you and I remained alone with my sick mother and brother. Under these circumstances, I do not find anyone who aids me in taking care of them and the atmosphere around me is depressed and sad. So, I was forced to think of what I didn t think of before... I thought of separating from you, leaving behind my history which I made in you through long years and beginning a new history away from you.
However, my sick mother did not wish to leave you. She told all around her: I wish that my son bury me in Baghdad before leaving the city. She wanted to be buried close to my deceased father to be loyal to him even in death. She also felt that her sick body would not endure the hardships of the long way away from you. Her wish was fulfilled and she passed away fifty days before leaving you. My deceased mother faced her end fearlessly and even she had prepared the new clothes that she would wear when being shrouded years ahead! Your soil, my beloved Baghdad , contains now the remains of my beloved precious mother, beside the remains of my father and sister that will increase the pain of being away from you. I kept taking care of my father, sister and finally of my mother during their well-being and sickness and they all passed away satisfied with me.
However, what will relieve my pain is that I am leaving you to beloved Yerevan, which is in my dreams since my childhood, but you are the beloved city which lived in and with me. But, from now on, the situation will be reversed; the beloved Yerevan will be the city where I ll live and you ll be the beloved city in my dreams. Your wounds will heal; you ll restore your charming image and will remain in my heart forever.
The last place I visited before leaving you, my beloved Baghdad, was the site of the house I was born in the street of your Colonel Abdul Karim Qasim. He led in you the 14th of July 1958 revolution against the royal regime, declared the republican regime and led Iraq for less than five years (1958-1963).
I took a long look at the site of the house which is now a private hospital and sat in a restaurant in the opposite side. I ate my launch there to spend more time looking at the site, although the restaurant was not offering my favorite meals!!
I remembered, my beloved Baghdad, what my deceased father and mother told me about the circumstances that surrounded my birth in this house. My birthday (November 8th 1960) came across martial law declared because of the unstable political and security conditions prevailed in Iraq then. My father was standing in the street in front of our house at late night waiting for a taxi car to take my mother to a hospital to give birth to me. The Colonel Abdul Karim Qasim, who used to return from the meetings of the Cabinet after midnight to his house opposite to our house in the street that bears his name so far, passed by. He asked my father, whom he knew as a neighbor, about the reason of waiting in the street at that late time of night. After knowing the reason, the Colonel ordered his guards to take my father and mother by his own car to the hospital where I was born in the six o clock in the morning!
Taking a look at the site, I also remembered my childhood and youth years I spent in this house for more than a quarter century. My family sold the house to a group of well-known doctors and surgeons who erected a new hospital at the location of the house which became a widely known private hospital in Baghdad.
Good-bye, my beloved Baghdad These are the most difficult moments in the life of your pious son; the moments of separation from you. I ll miss you; miss your immortal Tigris River, my home and life in you and the kindness of your people. I ll keep praying for you so you recover your health and bloom. During your history, you proved the calamities and the difficulties did not ever affect you and you were soon rising to take your fitting status.
Good-bye, my beloved Baghdad, you are in me forever despite the distance that apart us. Separation from you is difficult and bitter. May God help me to bear it.
Good-bye, my beloved Baghdad
By Ara S. Ashjian
Baghdad, Iraq
For Karabakh-Open.com

The sun is more beautiful in my country than any other, and darkness . . .
Even darkness--there, is more beautiful . . .
for it embraces Iraq. --Badr Shakir Al-Sayyab, 1953.
Sunday, September 23, 2007
Mercenaries Above the Law
"What happened Sunday is part of a deadly pattern, not just of Blackwater USA's conduct, but of the army of mercenaries that have descended on Iraq over the past four years. They have acted like cowboys, running Iraqis off the road, firing indiscriminately at vehicles and, in some cases, private forces have appeared on tape seemingly using Iraqis for target practice. They have shown little regard for Iraqi lives and have fueled the violence in that country, not just against the people of Iraq but also against the official soldiers of the United States military in the form of blowback and revenge attacks stemming from contractor misconduct. These private forces have operated in a climate where impunity and immunity have gone hand in hand."
And of course, the Iraqi government is "sovereign" only when it suits the U.S.: Blackwater Working Again in Iraq. (i.e., go to hell, puppet. Who are you to complain?)
From the Times:
"American Embassy officials had said Monday that the Blackwater guards had been responding to a car bomb, but Mr. Dabbagh said the bomb was so far away that it could not possibly have been a reason for the convoy to begin shooting.
Instead, he said, the convoy had initiated the shooting when a car did not heed a police officer and moved into an intersection.
“The traffic policeman was trying to open the road for them,” he said. “It was a crowded square. But one small car did not stop. It was moving very slowly. They shot against the couple and their child. They started shooting randomly.”
In video shot shortly after the episode, the child appeared to have burned to the mother’s body after the car caught fire, according to an official who saw it.
In interviews on Tuesday, six Iraqis who had been in the area at the time of the shooting, including a man who was wounded and an Iraqi Army soldier who helped rescue people, offered roughly similar versions.
The Iraqi soldier, who said he was standing at a checkpoint on the edge of the square, said he thought the convoy believed the small car was a suicide bomber and opened fire. According to the wounded man, recuperating in Yarmouk Hospital, the car with the family was driving on the wrong side of the road.
The convoy began throwing nonlethal sound bombs, several witnesses said, to keep people in the area away. That drew fire from Iraqi Army soldiers manning watchtowers that are part of an Iraqi Army base on the square. Iraqi police officers, witnesses said, also appeared to be shooting.
The Iraqi soldier, who did not give his name but said he was from a company of Iraqi commandos, said he saw another soldier trying to motion to the convoy to move on, but he was shot as well."
Blackwater Guards Fired Unprovoked (AP).
Private Security in Iraq: Whose Rules?:
Iraqis have long bristled at the presence of the private guards, who they claim are little more than mercenaries with little respect for Iraqi lives and less discipline than uniformed US troops.
An Iraqi police officer who works in Karada, a mixed sectarian neighborhood in eastern Baghdad, says the foreign private security firms act out of their own interests as they jet through the city and seem to pay little heed to the dangers they pose to average citizens on the street.
The officer says employees of the firms use overly aggressive tactics, crashing into cars and disobeying traffic laws and often rolling over gardens and hitting trees – and never stopping.
He says he once tried to help an Iraqi driver who was gravely wounded by private security guards even though he had tried to get out of their way. "They are bad," he says.
Many Americans are probably unaware that private security contractors, like Blackwater (there are dozens more, forming a total of up to 140,000 contractors, most of them American), are immune to any prosecution under both American and Iraqi law, civil or military, which is why you get Wild West cowboy behaviour like this:
More from Iraqi bloggers: Baghdad Treasure, Baghdad Connect, Zappy.
Thursday, August 09, 2007
Three Nights at the Airport "Prison"

My brother in law Mohammed has a long post describing the treatment that he and my sister received by Jordanian authorities at the Queen Alia International Airport in Amman a couple of weeks ago. They were detained for three days in the "prison" that I described earlier in my previous post.
Then an officer came to us and told us that we aren't going to enter Amman in the most humiliating way of speaking and walked away. I tried to talk to him but he closed the door in my face. I was so angry of the way he treated us; we are locked in a small room now, and my wife is scared of closed places. She was so scared and she began to cry hysterically. I felt that she will die if she stayed like this and again there was nothing I can do. This really makes me hate my self when I can do nothing. I knocked on the door many times but no one answered. It's like a prison, I shouted: don't let us in, just let us out, get us back to Iraq, I don't want to be humiliated like this. There was no answer; they just ignored us again.
After an hour of my wife crying; her eyes are so swelled now. Then another humiliating officer talked to us like we were dogs: "Get the hell out of here and go to that room," he pointed. We walked and we saw a dirty corridor with blankets and 3 small rooms. You will sleep the night here, he said. He pushed all of us and locked the door. At this time I wish I could kill one of them for the humiliation we received from them. All of us were so scared from the idea that we will sleep in a jail for the first time in our lives for no crime we did, just because we are Iraqis. Why does everyone treat Iraqis like this? We are humans. We aren't aliens. We are not animals to be put in jail for no crime.
I walked and I saw another man in one of the rooms. He was very classy. He smiled kindly when I entered. I asked, did they return you also? How long have you been here? He said, "Yes they did and this is the fifth time they return me. I don't want to enter the land of dogs "he meant Jordan" all I want is my money; all my money is there, and I want to draw it, but the dogs didn't let me in. Tell your wife that there is no need to cry like this for the land of the dogs, and if she continues crying they might tell her some words that she will not like and will never forget. This happened before and I have seen it."
Of course not only my wife was crying but all the women in the "Jail" or what the Jordanians call the Waiting Hall. All the men had red eyes. They struggled to keep the tears in their eyes, and I was one of them. I don't know why they were so sad; may be some of them for the price of the ticket $644 which was lost, maybe for the business and opportunity they have lost, but for me it's for the humiliation and disrespect I have seen, for the way Jordanians treat Iraqis, for the lost chance of seeing our parents.
More.

Tuesday, July 31, 2007
Iraqis Sleep on Floor at Airport "Prison"
UPDATE: I just learned that my sister and her husband were denied entry to Jordan two days ago. They are back in Baghdad now and might try to enter Syria soon. My father is going to make the same trip to Jordan in a couple of weeks for an interview with UNHCR. If he is denied entry then the breakup of my family would be complete, stranded between four countries, and there would be no hope for resettlement in a third country.
Iraqis in Jordan Celebrate Football Victory




More.
UPDATE: Celebrations of different Iraqi communities in Iraq and worldwide:
San Diego, U.S.A.
London, U.K.
Stockholm, Sweden.
Stockholm, Sweden (2).
Sodertalje, Sweden.
Gutenberg, Sweden.
Jonkoping, Sweden.
Norrkoping, Sweden.
Skellestea, Sweden.
Tampere, Finland.
Bonn, Germany.
Munich, Germany.
Munich, Germany (2).
Ludwigshafen, Germany.
Saarbrucken, Germany.
Copenhagen, Denmark.
Norway.
Seattle, U.S.A.
Toronto, Canada.
Montreal, Canada.
Melbourne, Australia.
Amman, Jordan.
Damascus, Syria.
Damascus, Syria (2).
Aleppo, Syria.
Kuwait City, Kuwait.
Baghdad, Babel, Najaf, Thi Qar, and Suleimaniya.
Ramadi, Anbar.
Najaf, Najaf.
Nasiriya, Thi Qar.
ٌRifa'i, Thi Qar.
Shatra, Thi Qar.
Hamdaniya, Ninewa.
Talkaif, Ninewa.
Bartalla, Ninewa.
Shaqlawa, Erbil.
Tallasquf, Ninewa.
Alqosh, Ninewa.
Thursday, July 26, 2007
The cellphone video has been circulating on Iraqi websites. It is purportedly a video of Kurdish Peshmerga fighters in the Iraqi Army summarily executing a young unarmed man in Mosul this month. The sound is not clear but the soldiers were speaking the Kurdish dialect of Erbil, according to some Kurds who viewed the video. The man is swearing to them that he "has nothing," and the officer is heard telling the soldiers to release him, but they enter a heated argument with the officer, ending in their prostrating the man on the street and opening fire on him. No further details are available about the video.
Wednesday, July 25, 2007
Patterns of Sectarian Violence in Baghdad
By ZEYAD KASIM

Up to 592 unidentified bodies were found dumped in different parts of Baghdad in the period between June 18 and July 18, 2007, according to figures based on media reports compiled by Iraq Slogger. Most of the bodies found by the police – an average of 20 a day – are bound, blindfolded and shot execution style, victims of sectarian violence carried out by both Sunni and Shi’ite death squads. Many also bear signs of torture or mutilation, according to medical sources in Baghdad. Despite official Iraqi and U.S. statements to the contrary, the reports indicate that the number of unidentified bodies in the capital has risen again to pre-surge levels over the last two months.
More.
Sunday, July 15, 2007
Former Sunni Insurgents Now "Freedom Fighters"
The "Amiriya Freedom Fighters," who the U.S. military is now funding and arming, are former members of the Islamic Army in Iraq, an Islamic nationalist insurgent group based in Baghdad, Anbar, Babel, Salah Al-Din, and Diyala, thought to be composed largely of former Iraqi army officers.
With support from the U.S. military and local residents, the small group of fighters was successful in driving out Al-Qaeda-led Islamic State of Iraq militants from Amiriya, a predominately Sunni district in southwestern Baghdad.
Dr. Ali Al-Ni'aimi, an official spokesman of the insurgent group, denied working with U.S. troops, but implied that the militants of Amiriya have broke away from the insurgent group, which continues to target U.S. troops in Iraq. It is also possible that the insurgent group - like the tribal fighters of Anbar - has made a clever tactical move to both eliminate Islamic State of Iraq militants from their areas, and to make use of U.S. arms and funds in preparation for future conflicts.
It's now official; the U.S. is arming all parties to the civil war in Iraq.




More.
Saturday, June 30, 2007
The Baghdad Death Map
By ZEYAD KASIM

In their distinctive style of morbid humor, resourceful Baghdadis are circulating emails presenting their own personal assessment of the security situation in the capital. The detailed lists of what neighborhoods and areas are safe and what to avoid completely, because of Mahdi Army or Al-Qaeda activity or the random car bomb, are quite different from those found in Iraqi government or U.S. military statements. As many parts of the capital have become no-go zones for members of either the Sunni or Shia sect – or sometimes for both, it is a challenge for Baghdadis to identify areas where they are able to move freely and areas where they should better stay out.
The following is a translation of one such email making the rounds among residents of Baghdad and on Iraqi Web forums. The sarcastic email, which was written in Iraqi slang, attempts to classify the districts of Baghdad based on their level of danger. According to the author, the safest neighborhoods are the ones where the odds of staying alive are 50%:
More.
According to their description, the soldiers were civil and well-mannered. They were just asking if my family had any weapons. My mother said, "No, we have nothing. Not even a knife." One soldier pointed to the kitchen and said, "Obviously you have knives." They also tried to give them a phone number so they could report insurgent activity.
Then they searched my grandmother's and uncle's house next door. Some of them sat in our garden, while my mother and father were sitting behind them on the patio drinking tea and reading a newspaper (there was no electricity and it's hot inside). My mother said two soldiers suddenly turned and pointed their weapons at my mother and father for no particular reason. They stayed in that position until their fellow team members finished the search and they left.

